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CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

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Second draft, January 1998
Comments welcome

To appear in Deborah Tannen, Deborah Schiffrin & Heidi Hamilton (Eds.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (in preparation).

What is Critical Discourse Analysis?

Critical Discourse Analysis is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose and ultimately to resist social inequality.

Some of the tenets of Critical Discourse Analysis can already be found in the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School before the Second World War (Rasmussen, 1996). Its current focus on language and discourse was initiated with the 'critical linguistics' that emerged (mostly in the UK and Australia) at the end of the 1970s (Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew, 1979; see also Mey, 1985).

CDA, as it is commonly abbreviated, has counterparts in 'critical' developments in sociolinguistics, psychology and the social sciences, some already dating back to the early 1970s (Birnbaum, 1971; Calhoun, 1995; Fay, 1987; Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997; Hymes, 1972; Ibañez & Iñiguez, 1997; Singh, 1996; Thomas, 1993; Turkel, 1996; Wodak, 1996). As is the case in these neighboring disciplines, CDA may be seen as a reaction against the dominant formal (often 'asocial' or 'uncritical') paradigms of the 1960s and 1970s.

CDA is not so much a direction, school or specialization -- next to the many other 'approaches' in discourse studies. Rather, it aims to offer a different 'mode' or 'perspective' of theorizing, analysis and application throughout the whole field. We may find a more or less critical perspective in such diverse areas as pragmatics, conversation analysis, narrative analysis, rhetoric, stylistics, sociolinguistics, ethnography, or media analysis, among others.

Discourse analysis and society

Crucial for critical discourse analysts is the explicit awareness of their role in society. Continuing a tradition that rejects the possibility of a 'value-free' science, they argue that science, and especially scholarly discourse, are inherently part of, and influenced by social structure, and produced in social interaction. Instead of denying or ignoring such a relation between scholarship and society, they plead that such relations be studied and accounted for in their own right, and that scholarly practices should be based on such insights. Theory formation, description and explanation, also in discourse analysis, are socio-politically 'situated', whether we like it or not. Reflection on the role of scholars in society and the polity thus becomes inherent part of the discourse analytical enterprise. This may mean, among other things, that discourse analysts conduct research in solidarity and cooperation with dominated groups.

Critical research on discourse needs to satisfy a number of requirements in order to effectively realize its aims:

- As is often the case for more marginal research traditions, CDA research has to be 'better' than other research in order to be accepted.
- It focuses primarily on *social problems* and political issues, rather than on current paradigms and fashions.
- Empirically adequate critical analysis of social problems is usually *multidisciplinary*.
- Rather than to merely *describe* discourse structures, it tries to *explain* them in terms of properties of social interaction and especially social structure.
- More specifically CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge relations of *power* and *dominance* in society.

Fairclough & Wodak (1997: 271-280) summarize the main tenets of CDA as follows:

1. CDA addresses social problems
2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse Constitutes Society and Culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

Whereas some of these tenets have also been discussed above, others need a more systematic theoretical analysis, of which we shall present some fragments here as a more or less general basis for the main principles of CDA (for details about these aims of critical discourse and language studies, see, e.g., Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard, 1996; Fairclough, 1995; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew, 1979; Van Dijk, 1993b).

Conceptual and Theoretical frameworks

Since CDA is not a specific direction of research, it does not have a unitary theoretical framework. Within the aims mentioned above, there are many types of CDA, and these may be theoretically and analytically quite diverse. Critical analysis of conversation is very different from an analysis of news reports in the press or of lessons and teaching at school. Yet, given the common perspective and the general aims of CDA, we may also find overall conceptual and theoretical frameworks that are closely related. As suggested, most kinds of CDA will ask questions about the way specific discourse structures are deployed in the reproduction of social dominance, whether they are part of a conversation or a news report or other genres and contexts.

Thus, the typical vocabulary of many scholars in CDA will feature such notions as 'power', 'dominance', 'hegemony', 'ideology', 'class', 'gender', 'race', 'discrimination', 'interests', 'reproduction', 'institutions', 'social structure' or 'social order', besides the more familiar discourse analytical notions.

It comes as no surprise that also CDA research will often refer to the leading social philosophers and social scientists of our time when theorizing these and other fundamental notions. Thus, reference to the leading scholars of the Frankfurter Schule and to the contemporary work by Habermas (for instance on legitimation and his last 'discourse' approach to norms and democracy) is of course common in critical analysis. Similarly, many critical studies will refer to Foucault when dealing with notions such as power, domination and discipline or the more philosophical notion of 'orders of discourse'. More recently, the many studies on language, culture and society by Bourdieu have become increasingly influential, for instance his notion of 'habitus'. From another sociological perspective, Giddens' structuration theory is now occasionally mentioned.

These influences also show that one main tradition of critical studies, viz., the neo-marxist one, as for instance inspired by Gramsci, has now become increasingly replaced by other approaches. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail (and criticize) these various philosophical and sociological roots and influences in contemporary CDA. Also, it should be borne in mind that although several of these social philosophers and sociologists make extensive use of the notions of language and discourse, they seldom engage in explicit, systematic discourse analysis. Indeed, the last thing critical discourse scholars should do is to uncritically adopt philosophical or sociological ideas about language and discourse that are obviously uninformed by the advances in contemporary linguistics and discourse analysis. Rather, the work referred to here is mainly relevant for the use of fundamental concepts about the social order and hence for the meta-theory of CDA.

Thus, instead of an extensive review of philosophical and sociological work that might be relevant for the CDA enterprise, I shall rather focus on a number of basic concepts themselves, and thus devise a theoretical framework that critically relates discourse, cognition and society.

Macro vs. Micro

Language use, discourse, verbal interaction and communication belong to the micro-level of the social order. Power, dominance and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macro-level of analysis. This means that CDA has to theoretically bridge the well-known 'gap' between micro and macro approaches, which is of course a distinction that is a sociological construct in its own right (Alexander, et al., 1987; Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel, 1981). In everyday interaction and experience the macro and micro level (and intermediary 'meso-levels') form one, unified whole. For instance, a racist speech in parliament is a discourse at the micro-level of social interaction in the specific situation of a debate, but at the same time may enact or be a constituent part of legislation or the reproduction of racism, at the macro-level.

There are several ways to analyze and bridge these levels, and thus to arrive at a unified critical analysis:

(a) *Members-Groups* : Language users engage in discourse *as* members of (several) social groups, organizations or institutions; and conversely, groups thus may act 'by' their members.

(b) *Actions-Process* : Social acts of individual actors are thus constituent part of group actions and social processes, such as legislation, newsmaking or the reproduction of racism.

(c) *Context-Social Structure* . Situations of discursive interaction are similarly part or constitutive of social structure, such as a press conference may a typical practice of organizations and media institutions. That is, 'local' and more 'global' contexts are closely related, and both exercise constraints on discourse.

(d) *Personal and Social Cognition*: Language users as social actors have both personal and social cognition: personal memories, knowledge and opinions, as well as those shared with members of the group or culture as a whole. Both types of cognition influence interaction and discourse of individual members, whereas shared 'social representations' govern the collective actions of a group. Thus, cognition is also the crucial interface (or with a biological metaphor: the missing link) between the personal and the social, and hence between individual discourse and social structure.

More specifically focusing on the discourse dimension of these various levels or dimensions of 'mediation' between the macro and the micro, the same principles may apply to the relations between (a) specific instances of text and talk (e.g., a news report), (b) more complex communicative events (all actions involved in producing and reading news reports), (c) news reports in general, as a genre, and (d) the order of discourse of the mass media (see also Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 277-278).

Power as control

A central notion in most critical work on discourse is that of power, and more specifically the *social power* of groups or institutions. Summarizing a complex philosophical and social analysis, we'll define social power in terms of *control*. Thus, groups have (more or less) power if they are able to (more or less) control the acts and minds of (members of) other groups. This ability presupposes a *power base* of (privileged access to) scarce social resources, such as force, money, status, fame, knowledge, information, 'culture' or indeed various forms of public discourse and communication (of the vast literature on power, see, e.g., Lukes, 1986; Wrong, 1979).

Different *types of power* may be distinguished according to the various resources employed to exercise such power: The coercive power of the military and of violent men will rather be based on force, the rich will have power because of their money, whereas the more or less persuasive power of parents, professors or journalists may be based on knowledge, information or authority. Note also that power is seldom absolute. Groups may more or less control other groups, or only control them in specific situations or social domains. Moreover, dominated groups may more or less resist, accept, condone, comply with or legitimate such power, and even find it 'natural'. Indeed, the power of dominant groups may be integrated in laws, rules, norms, habits and even a quite general consensus, and thus take the form of what Gramsci called 'hegemony' (Gramsci, 1971). Class domination, sexism and racism are characteristic examples of such hegemony. Note also that power is not always exercised in obviously abusive acts of dominant group members, but may be enacted in the myriad of taken-for-granted actions of everyday life. Similarly, not all members of a powerful group are always more powerful than all members of dominated groups: Power is only defined here for groups as a whole.

For our analysis of the relations between discourse and power, thus, we first find that access to specific forms of discourse, e.g., those of politics, the media or science, is itself a power resource. Secondly, as suggested earlier, action is controlled by our minds. So, if we are able to influence people's minds, e.g., their knowledge or opinions, we indirectly may control (some of) their actions. And, thirdly, since people's minds are typically influenced by text and talk, we find that discourse may at least indirectly control people's actions, as we know from persuasion and manipulation.

Closing the discourse-power circle, finally, this means that those groups who control most influential discourse also have more chances to control the minds and actions of others.

CDA focuses on the *abuse* of such power, and especially on *dominance*, that is, on the ways control over discourse is abused to control people's beliefs and actions in the interest of dominant groups, and against the best interests or the will of the others. 'Abuse' in this case may be (very roughly) characterized as a norm-violation that hurts others, given some ethical standard, such as (just) rules, agreements, laws or human rights principles. In other words, dominance may be briefly defined as the illegitimate exercise of power.

Simplifying these very intricate relationships even further for this chapter, we shall split up the issue of discursive power into three basic questions for CDA-research:

- a. How do (more) powerful groups control public discourse?
- b. How does such discourse control mind and action of (less) powerful groups, and what are the social consequences of such control, such as social inequality?
- c. How do dominated groups discursively challenge or resist such power.

Access and discourse control

We have seen that among many other resources that define the power base of a group or institution, also *access* to, or *control over* public discourse and communication is an important 'symbolic' resource, as is the case for knowledge and information (Van Dijk, 1996).

Most people only have active control over everyday talk with family members, friends or colleagues, and passive control over, e.g., media usage. In many situations, ordinary people are more or less passive targets of text or talk, e.g., of their bosses or teachers, or of the authorities, such as police officers, judges, welfare bureaucrats or tax inspectors, who may simply tell them what (not) to believe or what to do.

On the other hand, members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites), have more or less exclusive access to, and control over one or more types of public discourse. Thus, professors control scholarly discourse, teachers educational discourse, journalists media discourse, lawyers legal discourse, and politicians policy and other public political discourse. Those who have more control over more --and more influential-- discourse (and more discourse properties) are by that definition also more powerful. In other words, we here propose a discursive definition (as well as a practical diagnostic) of one of the crucial constituents of social power.

These notions of discourse access and control are very general, and it is one of the tasks of CDA to spell out these forms of power. Thus, if discourse is defined in terms of complex communicative events, access and control may be defined both for the *context* and for the *structures of text and talk* itself.

Context Control

Context is defined as the (mentally represented) structure of those properties of the social situation that are relevant for the production or comprehension of discourse (Duranti & Goodwin, 1992; Van Dijk, 1998). It consists of such categories as the overall definition of the situation, setting (time, place), ongoing actions (including discourses and discourse genres), participants in various communicative, social or institutional roles, as well as their mental representations: goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes and ideologies.

Controlling context involves control over one or more of these categories, e.g., determining the definition of the communicative situation, deciding on time and place of

the communicative event, or on which participants may or must be present, and in which roles, or what knowledge or opinions they should (not) have, and which social actions may or must be accomplished by discourse (Diamond, 1996).

It is thus that the contexts of a parliamentary debate, a board meeting, a trial, a lecture, or a consult with one's doctor are usually controlled by (members) of dominant groups. Thus, only MPs have access to a parliamentary debate, and only they may speak (with permission of the Speaker or Chair, and for a specific amount of time) and represent their constituencies, vote on a Bill, and so on. In a trial, only juries or judges have access to specific speaking roles and genres such as verdicts. Secretaries may have access to board meetings, but often only in the role of silently writing the minutes. A CDA-approach specifically focuses on those forms of context control that are in the best interests of the dominant group.

The Control of Text and Talk

Crucial in the enactment or exercise of group power is the control over the structures of text and talk. Relating text and context, thus, we already saw that (members of) powerful groups may decide on the (possible) discourse *genre(s)* or *speech acts* of an occasion. A teacher or judge may require a direct answer from a student or suspect, respectively, and not a personal story or an argument (Wodak, 1984a, 1986). More critically, we may examine how powerful speakers may abuse of their power in such situations, e.g., when police officers use force to get a confession from a suspect (Linell & Jonsson, 1991), or when male editors exclude women from writing economic news (Van Zoonen, 1994).

Similarly, genres typically have conventional *schemata* consisting of various *categories*. Access to some of these may be prohibited or obligatory, as when opening or closing a parliamentary session is a prerogative of the Speaker, and some greetings in a conversation may only be used by speakers of a specific social group, rank, age or gender (Irvine, 1974).

Vital for all discourse and communication is who controls the *topics* (semantic macrostructures) and topic change, as when editors decide what news topics will be covered (Gans, 1979; Van Dijk, 1988a, 1988b), professors what topics will be dealt with in class, or men may control topics and topic change in conversations with women (Palmer, 1989; Fishman, 1983; Leet-Pellegrini, 1980; Lindegren-Lerman, 1983). As with other forms of discourse control, such decisions may be (more or less) negotiable among the participants, and depend very much on context, that is on how participants interpret the communicative situation.

Although most discourse control is contextual or global, even local details of *meaning*, *form* or *style* may be controlled, e.g., the details of an answer in class or court, choice of lexical items or jargon in courtrooms, classrooms or newsrooms (Martin Rojo, 1994). In many situations volume may be controlled and speakers ordered to 'keep their voice down' or to 'keep quiet', women may be 'silenced' in many ways (Houston & Kramarae, 1991), and in some cultures one need to 'mumble' as a form of respect (Albert, 1972).

The public use of specific words may be banned as subversive in a dictatorship, and discursive challenges to culturally dominant groups (e.g., white, western males) by their multicultural opponents may be ridiculed in the media as 'politically correct' (Williams, 1995). And finally, action and interaction dimensions of discourse may be controlled by prescribing or proscribing specific speech acts, and by selectively distributing or interrupting turns (see also Diamond, 1996).

Across levels, what we may conclude from many critical studies is the prominence of overall strategy of *Positive Self-Presentation* of the dominant ingroup, and *Negative Other-Presentation* of the dominated outgroups (Van Dijk, 1993a, 1998b). The polarization of Us and Them that characterizes shared social representations and their underlying ideologies is thus expressed and reproduced at all levels of text and talk, e.g., in contrastive topics, local meanings, metaphor and hyperbole, and the variable formulations in text schemata, syntactic forms, lexicalization, sound structures and images.

In sum, virtually all levels and structures of context, text and talk can in principle be more or less controlled by powerful speakers, and such power may be abused at the expense of other participants. It should however be stressed that talk and text do not always and directly enact or embody the overall power relations between groups: It is always the context that may interfere, reinforce or otherwise transform such relationships. Obviously not all men are always dominant in all conversations (Kotthoff & Wodak, 1997; Tannen, 1994a), nor all whites or professors, for that matter.

Mind control

If controlling discourse is a first major form of power, controlling people's minds is the other fundamental way to reproduce dominance and hegemony. Note though that 'mind control' is merely a handy phrase to summarize a very complex process. Cognitive psychology and mass communication research have shown that influencing the mind is not as straightforward a process as simplistic ideas about mind control might suggest (Britton & Graesser, 1996; Glasser & Salmon, 1995; Klapper, 1960; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Recipients may be quite autonomous and variable in their interpretation and uses of text and talk, also as a function of class, gender or culture (Liebes & Katz, 1990). But although recipients will seldom passively accept the intended opinions of specific discourses, we should on the other hand not forget that most of our beliefs about the world are acquired through discourse.

Within a CDA-framework, 'mind control' involves more than just acquiring beliefs about the world through discourse and communication. The element of power and dominance in this case enters the picture in various ways, e.g., as follows:

(a) Unless inconsistent with their personal beliefs and experiences, recipients tend to accept beliefs (knowledge and opinions) through discourse from what they see as authoritative, trustworthy or credible sources, such as scholars, experts, professionals or reliable media (Nesler, et al. 1993). In this sense, powerful discourse is (contextually)

defined in terms of the perceived power of its authors; for the same reasons, minorities and women may often be perceived as less credible (Andsager, 1990; Khatib, 1989; Verrillo, 1996).

(b) In some situations participants are obliged to be recipients of discourse, e.g., in education and in many job situations. Lessons, learning materials, job instructions, and other discourse types in such cases may need to be attended to, interpreted and learned as intended by institutional or organizational authors (Giroux, 1981).

(c) In many situations there are no other public discourses or media that may provide information from which alternative beliefs may be derived (Downing, 1984).

(d) And, closely related to the previous points: Recipients may not have the knowledge and beliefs needed to challenge the discourses or information they are exposed to (Wodak, 1987).

These four points suggest that discursive mind control is a form of power and dominance if such control is in the interest of the powerful and if the recipients have 'no alternatives', i.e., no other sources (speakers, writers), no other discourses, no other option but to listen or read, and no relevant other beliefs to evaluate such discourses. If freedom is defined as having the opportunity to think and do what one wants, then such lacking alternatives are by definition a limitation of the freedom of the recipients. And limiting the freedom of others, especially in one's own interest, happens to be one of the definitions of power and domination.

Whereas these conditions of mind control are largely *contextual* (they say something about the participants of a communicative event), other conditions are *discursive*, that is, a function of the structures and strategies of text or talk itself. In other words, given a specific context, certain meanings and forms of discourse have more influence on people's minds than others, as the very notion of 'persuasion' and a tradition of 2000 years of rhetoric may show.

Analyzing the mind

In order to analyze the complex processes involved in how discourse may control people's minds, we would need to spell out the detailed mental representations and cognitive operations studied in cognitive science. Since even an adequate summary is beyond the scope of this chapter, we'll only briefly introduce a few notions that are necessary to understand the processes of discursive mind control (for details, see, e.g., Graesser & Bower, 1990; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Van Oostendorp & Zwaan, 1994; Weaver, Mannes & Fletcher, 1995).

A first useful distinction is usually made between personal or *episodic memory*, and *social memory*. The first may be defined as the store of experiences or subjective representations, called *mental models*, consisting of the specific knowledge and opinions people have accumulated during their lifetime. Also the experience of the ongoing

situation, interaction and discourse is thus represented in a mental model, which we call a *context model* (Van Dijk, 1998b). The second type of memory consists of the *social representations*, such as more general and abstract socio-cultural knowledge, attitudes or ideologies, people share with other members of a group. Although this distinction is often quite clear, it should be noted that groups may also share beliefs about 'collective experiences' or specific historical events, as is typically the case for the Holocaust.

Thus, an everyday story will typically be based on a mental model of a personal experience, whereas a party program or racist slogans rather express the beliefs of a group. Of course, because language users are not just individuals but may also speak or write as members of (several) groups, their discourses may also express socially shared mental representations of these groups. Within a group, social representations are typically *presupposed* (while taken for granted) by the discourses of group members.

Discursive mind control may now be defined as the control of the mental models and/or social representations of other people. Such control is a form of domination (power abuse), if it is in the interest of the powerful and against the best interests of those who are thus controlled (persuaded, manipulated). Obviously, for the purposes of CDA-research, interested in social power and domination, it is the control of social representations of a group that is most relevant for analysis. Such control may affect both the knowledge (factual beliefs) of a group, as well as the socially shared opinions (evaluative beliefs), such as attitudes and ideologies, of the group.

The discourse strategies of mind control

Now we have elementary insight into some of the structures of the mind, and what it means to control it, the crucial question is how discourse and its structures are able to exercise such control. As we have seen above in the analysis of control over discourse, such discursive influence may be due to *context* as well as to the *structures of text and talk themselves*.

Contextually based control derives from the fact that people not only understand and represent text and talk, but also the whole communicative situation. People are not merely influenced, persuaded or manipulated by properties of discourse, but also by those of speakers or writers, such as their (perceived) power, authority or credibility (Giles & Coupland, 1991). Similarly, also other factors of the situation (time, place, circumstances, roles and wishes of participants) may be involved in how communicative events control our minds. CDA typically studies how context features (such as the properties of language users of powerful groups) influence the ways members of dominated groups define the communicative situation in 'preferred context models' (Martin Rojo & Van Dijk, 1997).

More crucially, CDA focuses on how *discourse structures* influence mental representations. Thus, at the *global level* of discourse, *topics* may influence what people see as the most important information of text or talk, and thus correspond to the top levels of their mental models. Expressing such topics in the news *schema category* of a

Headline, may even more powerfully influence how an event is defined in terms of such a 'preferred' mental model, for instance when crime of minorities is typically topicalized and headlined in the press (Duin, et al., 1988; Van Dijk, 1991). Similarly, argumentation may be persuasive because of the social opinions that are 'hidden' in its implicit premises, and that thus may be taken for granted by the recipients. Thus, immigration may thus be restricted if it is presupposed in a parliamentary debate that all refugees are 'illegal'.

Similarly, at the *local level*, in order to understand discourse *meaning* and *coherence*, people may need models featuring beliefs that remain implicit (presupposed) in discourse. This is a typical feature of manipulation: To communicate beliefs implicitly, that is without actually asserting them, and with less chance that they will be challenged. Similarly, local meanings may be strategically employed to influence the formation of social representations by generalizations of models. This is why in much racist discourse speakers will not just tell a story about a specific event (which may be of little social consequence), but tend to add various forms of generalizations ('This always happens like that', or 'They are all the same')(van Dijk, 1984, 1987).

Lexical and syntactic surface structures (style) may vary as a condition of context, including the opinions of speakers (Giles & Coupland, 1991; Scherer & Giles, 1979), as the political use of the well-known lexical pair 'freedom fighter' vs. 'terrorist' shows. Much traditional work in critical linguistics focuses on such a 'biased' use of words, which is obviously intended to influence the opinions represented in the models of recipients. The same is true for the use of *rhetorical figures* such as metaphors, similes, hyperboles or euphemisms, which may emphasize or de-emphasize opinions, for instance within the general strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation in much racist or nationalist discourse (see below).

Speech acts are largely defined by context models, but whether or not an utterance is interpreted as a threat or as good advice may vitally influence text processing (Colebrook & McHoul, 1996; Graesser, et al. 1996). The many *interactional dimensions* of discourse, such as turn taking and sequencing, are also based on, and influence the updating of models. Power and authority of speakers as enacted by turn control, may at the same time enhance the perceived credibility of speakers and hence the construction of models as being 'true'.

Complications

With these few examples, we see how various types of discourse structure may influence the formation and change of mental models and social representations. If dominant groups, and especially their elites largely control public discourse and its structures, they thus also have more control over the minds of the public at large. However, as suggested before, such control has its limits. The complexity of comprehension and the formation and change of beliefs, are such that one cannot always predict which features of a specific text or talk will have which effects on the minds of specific recipients.

With these brief remarks about the relations between discourse structures and mental structures, the theoretical circle that relates society and discourse, via cognition, has been closed. That is, we have a (still very general) picture of how discourse is involved dominance (power abuse) and in the production and reproduction of social inequality. It is the aim of CDA to investigate these relationships in more detail.

I should be stressed again, however, that the picture just sketched is very schematic and general. The relations between the social power of groups and institutions, on the one hand, and discourse on the other, as well as between discourse and cognition, and cognition and society are vastly more complex. There are many contradictions. There is not always a clear picture of one dominant group (or class, or institution) oppressing another one, controlling all public discourse, and such discourse directly controlling the mind of the dominated. There are many forms of collusion, consensus, legitimation and even 'joint production' of forms of inequality. Members of dominant groups may become dissidents and side with dominated groups, and vice versa -- members of dominated groups may take and defend opinions that are consistent with those of the dominant elites. Opponent discourses may be adopted by dominant groups, whether strategically to neutralize them, or simply because also dominant power and ideologies may change, as is for instance quite obvious in ecological discourse and ideology. In other words, the complexities may be more interesting than the overall picture.

Research in Critical Discourse Analysis

The theory of the relation between discourse and social inequality outlined above allows us to examine and evaluate contemporary research carried out in the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (for other reviews and introductions, see also, Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard, 1996; Fairclough, 1995; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Van Dijk, 1993).

It should be emphasized, however, that although to date most discourse studies dealing with any aspect of power, domination and social inequality have not been explicitly conducted under the label of CDA, we shall nevertheless refer to some of these studies below.

Gender inequality

If there is one vast field of critical research on discourse and language that thus far was not carried out within a CDA-perspective, it is that of gender. In many ways, feminist work has become paradigmatic for much discourse analysis, especially since much of this work explicitly deals with social inequality and domination. We will not review it here, because it is being dealt with in detail elsewhere in this book (see also the books authored and edited by, e.g., (Cameron, 1990, 1992; Kotthoff & Wodak, 1997; Seidel, 1988; Thorne, Kramarae & Henley, 1983; Seidel, 1988; Wodak, 1997; for discussion and comparison with an approach that emphasizes cultural differences rather than power differences and inequality, see, e.g., Tannen, 1994a; see also Tannen, 1994 for an

analysis of gender differences at work, in which many of the properties of discursive dominance are dealt with). Some of the issues dealt with in this work include:

- Power differences in everyday conversational interaction
- Verbal sexual harassment
- Gender inequalities in bureaucratic and professional text and talk
- Limited access to and control over various forms of media discourse
- Discrimination in hiring and glass ceilings in promotion in discourse producing organizations, such as the media and publishing industries
- Stereotypical and sexist representations of women in male-dominated discourse in general, and in the mass media in particular.

Again, despite significant changes in the position of women over the last decades, and despite many forms of successful oppositional and dissident discourse, most of these forms of discursive gender domination and inequality persist until today, although sometimes in more indirect and subtle manifestations. As one of the forms of ideological challenge, the many variants of feminist discourse itself bear witness of the social and theoretical sophistication of oppositional text and talk. Indeed, feminist scholarship is arguably the most extensive and theoretically most developed form of CDA, in which many forms of text, talk, interaction and communication have been examined for their enactment and reproduction of male dominance and female resistance.

Ethnocentrism, antisemitism, nationalism and racism

Less prominently than feminist work, but finding its roots in closely related oppositional movements of the 1960s, also the study of the role of discourse in the enactment and reproduction of ethnic and 'racial' inequality has slowly emerged in CDA. Traditionally, such work focused on ethnocentric and racist representations in the mass media, literature and film (Unesco, 1977; Wilson & Gutierrez, 1985; Hartmann & Husband, 1974; Van Dijk, 1991). Such representations continue centuries-old dominant images of the Other in the discourses of European travelers, explorers, merchants, soldiers, philosophers and historians, among other forms of elite discourse (Barker, 1978; Lauren, 1988). Fluctuating between the emphasis on exotic difference, on the one hand, and supremacist derogation stressing the Others' intellectual, moral and biological inferiority, on the other hand, such discourses also influenced public opinion and led to broadly shared social representations. It is the continuity of this sociocultural tradition of negative images about the Other that also partly explains the persistence of dominant patterns of representation in contemporary discourse, media and film (Shohat & Stam, 1994).

Change and variation in these patterns are essentially conditioned by socio-economic and socio-cultural constraints. Thus, dominant images of Africans and African Americans were adapted to the socio-economics of slavery, segregation, resistance and affirmative action, respectively, namely as being lazy, ostentatious, rebellious, violent, criminal, and today, involved with drugs and living on welfare. Below, we shall critically examine an influential contemporary book in which current representations of African Americans are displayed.

Socio-cultural constraints, such as changing norms and values about ethnic relations, have of course modified and occasionally mitigated the more blatant images of barely one generation ago, but hardly changed these fundamentally. Similar studies have been undertaken about the discourse representations of Native Americans, and of Latinos, Chinese, Japanese or other immigrants in the USA, and more generally of Other peoples, often as a function of socio-political constraints, such as war and terrorism (e.g., of Japanese and Arabs, respectively). The same is true for the contemporary discourses about Mediterranean 'guest-workers' and their families and descendants, about people from former colonies, and about other immigrants in Europe; about blacks and especially indigenous people in Latin America; about Asians and Aborigenes in Australia and New Zealand; and of Africans in South Africa.

Later discourse studies have gone beyond the more traditional, content-analytical analysis of 'images' of the Others, and probed deeper into the linguistic, semiotic, and other discursive properties of text and talk to and about minorities, immigrants and Other peoples (for detailed review, see the chapter by Wodak & Reisigl, this volume). Besides the mass media, advertising, film and textbooks, which were (and still are) the genres most commonly studied, this newer work also focuses on political discourse, scholarly discourse, everyday conversations, service encounters, talk shows, and a host of other genres.

Thus, in a vast research program carried out at the University of Amsterdam since the early 1980s, we examined how Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans, and ethnic relations generally, are represented in conversation, everyday stories, news reports, textbooks, parliamentary debates, corporate discourse and scholarly text and talk (Van Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993). Besides stereotypical topics of difference, deviation and threat, also story structures, conversational features (such as hesitations and repairs in mentioning Others), semantic moves such as disclaimers ('We have nothing against Blacks, but...', etc.), lexical description of Others, and a host of other discourse features were studied. The aim of these projects was to show how discourse expresses and reproduces underlying social representations of Others in the social and political context. Ter Wal (1997) applies this framework in a detailed study of the ways Italian political and media discourse gradually changed from an anti-racist commitment and benign representation of the 'extra-communitari' (non-Europeans), to a more stereotypical and negative portrayal of immigrants in terms of crime, deviance and threat.

Within a related critical perspective, extensive research in Germany by Siegfried Jaeger and associates was able to highlight similar discourse structures in everyday talk, the media and political discourse about Turks and other immigrants in Germany (among many other publications, see Jaeger, 1988, 1992; Jaeger & Link, 1993).

In a series of studies, combining detailed social and political discourse studies with an historical account of relevant contexts, Ruth Wodak and her associates examined past and current antisemitic discourse in Austria against the background of the Waldheim affair (see, e.g., Wodak, 1991, 1996; Wodak, et al., 1990). Their analysis examined many genres, ranging from spontaneous 'street talk', to press reports TV talk shows and political

discourse. They focus on a large number of strategies characteristic of 'we-discourse', including justification, blaming the victim, trivialization, denial, allusions, constructing the others as enemies in defenses against criticisms of antisemitism, combined with old blatant and current and more subtle stereotypes about Jews.

Other work carried out and directed by Ruth Wodak within this critical 'discourse-historical' paradigm focused on the representation of immigrants from Rumania, and on nationalism (Matouschek, Wodak & Janushek, 1995; Wodak & Kirsch, 1995; Wodak et al., 1997). As in the other studies mentioned above, this research examined various genres (media debates, political speeches, everyday conversations and street interviews, among others). One major contribution of this work is that it is able to show the influence of elite discourse on the prejudices and talk of the population at large, e.g., through an analysis of intertextual relationships and recontextualizations of popular discourse. Such discourses of identity and difference, show global strategies (of construction, destruction, legitimation and transformation) that manifest themselves in the local structures of text and talk.

Within a different framework, that of discursive psychology, Wetherell & Potter (1992), reconstructed prejudiced representations of Pakeha (white New Zealanders) about Maoris. They focused on discursive practices and interpretative repertoires, and examined how inequality and exploitation of aboriginal minorities are legitimated in everyday talk.

For the situation of recent immigration of Africans in Spain, Baron Hernandez (1996) analyzes some of the subtle linguistic properties of news discourse in mainstream media, such as the distribution of agency and responsibility for negative action. In an earlier collection (Martin Rojo, et al., 1994) the diversity and complexity of both extant minorities as well as the new immigration in Spain are highlighted, such as the media mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of foreigners and the scholarly discourses about the language of the gitanos ('gypsies'). Martin Rojo & Van Dijk (1997) examined the speech of a Spanish Secretary of the Interior in the justification of a military-style expulsion of African 'illegal immigrants', highlighting the various semantic, pragmatic and socio-political strategies of legitimation in the dominant discourse of the powerful.

An interesting result of most of these studies is the remarkable similarity between the stereotypes, prejudices and other forms of verbal derogation, across discourse types, media, and national boundaries. Essentially, what we find is that the Others are predominantly represented in terms of (a) socio-cultural differences, (b) deviation from dominant norms and values, and (c) violence and threat. Thus, cultural differences will be enhanced and magnified and similarities ignored or mitigated. The Others will be seen as violating precisely those norms and values that the dominant group finds important. If hard work is an important value (or an economic necessity), the Others will be portrayed as lazy as is the case for blacks (or, on the other hand, and working *too* hard, and hence as an economic threat, as is the case of current stereotypes of Asians in the USA). If intelligence is particularly highlighted as a value, than the others are represented as intellectually inferior, as is the case until today in the debates on alleged racial differences of IQ or on quota and affirmative action in higher education (see our analysis

below). Or they may be represented as *too* smart, and hence as an economic and cultural threat, as is the case for the representation of Jews. If we self-represent ourselves as modern, than the Others are backward, and if we highly value religious tolerance, the Others are fundamentalists. In all situations, the Others will be seen as engaging in situationally relevant crimes, e.g., the drug traffic today. Whereas this is basically true for Other men, Other women may be similarly portrayed as deviating from 'our' values for 'good women', e.g., as sexually promiscuous. As suggested before such cognitive and discursive polarization may fluctuate between emphasizing differences, stressing deviation and focusing on the Others as a menace of 'our' most cherished material and symbolic resources: territory, nationality, neighborhood, space, income, housing, work, language, religion, welfare, and so on (see also Whillock & Slayden, 1995).

Besides such consistent negative Other-presentation, the (white, European) ingroup is positively represented along these and other dimensions of relevant comparison. Especially in official discourse, for instance in parliamentary debates, national self-glorification in debates about immigration and ethnic and 'racial' affairs is common place in most Western Parliaments (Van Dijk, 1993).

From group domination to professional and institutional power

Critical studies of the role of discourse in the (re)production of gender and ethnic inequality characteristically exemplify the CDA-perspective on power abuse and dominance by specific social groups (unfortunately, the study of the discursive reproduction of class has been rather neglected in this perspective; for a related approach though, see Willis, 1977).

Many studies (whether under the CDA banner or not) critically examined focused on various genres of institutional and professional discourse, e.g., text and talk in the courtroom, political discourse, bureaucratic discourse, medical discourse, educational discourse, scholarly discourse, corporate discourse and media discourse, among many other (sets of) *genres*. In all these cases, power and dominance are associated with specific social domains (politics, media, law, education, science, etc.), their professional elites and institutions and the rules and routines that form the background of the everyday discursive reproduction of power in such domains and institutions. The victims or targets of such power are usually the public or citizens at large, the 'masses', clients, subjects, the audience, students and other groups that are dependent on institutional and organizational power. Let us briefly review some of these studies in these vast areas of critical studies of language, discourse and communication.

Media discourse

The undeniable power of the media has inspired many critical studies in many disciplines, not least in the field of mass communication itself. Also linguistics, semiotics, pragmatics and discourse studies have produced critical studies of reporting or TV programs. As we have seen for the media representations of women and minorities, the traditional (often content-analytical) approach in critical media studies has been the

analysis of biased, stereotypical- sexist or racist images in the media, both in texts as well as in illustrations and photos. The first studies of media language similarly focused on easily observable surface structures, such as the biased or partisan use of words in the description of Us and Them (and Our/Their actions and characteristics), especially along socio-political lines, for instance in the representation of communists. Great-Britain is arguably the country with most, and most interesting critical media studies. Although the tradition goes further back, the critical tone was set by a series of "Bad News" studies by the Glasgow University Media Group (1976, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1993). Although perhaps not strictly 'discourse analytical', these studies focused especially on TV reporting of industrial disputes (strikes), and later also on the Falkland (Malvinas) war, on the media coverage of AIDS, and various international issues. Through systematic analysis of such events, which also paid attention to photos en film footage, they were able to critically assess the sometimes subtle bias of the official media in favor of employers and nationalism in the case of the Falkland war, for instance by comparing who is interviewed how, in which location or with what camera angles.

Perhaps best known outside of discourse studies, is the media research carried out by Stuart Hall and his associates within the framework of the Cultural Studies paradigm (see, e.g., Hall, et al. 1980; for introduction to the critical work of Cultural Studies, see Agger, 1992). These studies were originally based on a combination of European neo-Marxist work (Gramsci, Althusser, Pecheux) with British socio-cultural approaches (Richard Hoggart, E.P. Thompson, Raymond Williams) and film analysis (Screen). They combined text analysis with analyses of images within a broad cultural approach to the media. Critical analysis of media discourse is dealt with here within a broader perspective of culture as the "dialectic between social being and social consciousness" (Hall), as interwoven with all social practices, and how people experience their social conditions. Among many other dimensions, such social practices, and especially the 'signifying practices' are examined especially for the ways they reproduce both culture and ideology (for another 'critical media' reader in the UK, see also Collins, et al., 1986; for earlier critical approaches to the analysis of media images, see also Davis & Walton, 1983; and for a later CDA approach to media studies that is related to the critical approach of cultural studies, see Fairclough, 1995).

One of the first studies in the new critical paradigm in linguistics and discourse studies, namely an early collection of work of Roger Fowler and his associates (Fowler, Hodge, Kress & Trew, 1979), also focused on the media. As with many other English and Australian studies in this paradigm, the theoretical framework of Halliday's functional-systemic grammar is used in a study of the 'transitivity' of syntactic patterns of sentences. The point of such research is that events and actions may be described with syntactic variations that are a function of the underlying involvement of actors (e.g., their agency, responsibility and perspective). Thus, in an analysis of the media accounts of the 'riots' during a minority festival, the responsibility of the authorities and especially of the police in such violence may be systematically de-emphasized by de-focusing, e.g., by passive constructions and nominalizations, that is by leaving agency and responsibility implicit. On the other hand, as is the case for the representation of Others in general, and for minorities in particular, their negative role in deviance and violence may be emphasized

by representing them as responsible agents in topical, subject position. Many subsequent studies of syntactic patterns of outgroup representations have arrived at similar conclusions (Fowler, 1991; Hodge & Kress, 1993; Van Dijk, 1991). Fowler, in his later critical studies of the media continues this tradition, but at the same time pays tribute to the influence of the British Cultural Studies paradigm that defines news not as a reflection of reality, but as a product shaped by political, economic and cultural forces (Fowler, 1991). More than in much other critical work on the media, he also focuses on the linguistic 'tools' for such a critical study, such as the analysis of transitivity in syntax, lexical structure, modality and speech acts. Similarly van Dijk (1988c) applies a theory of news discourse (van Dijk, 1988b) in critical studies of international news, racism in the press and the coverage of squatters in Amsterdam.

Elsewhere, critical media studies focused less on discourse structures. In the USA, thus, Chomsky and Herman, in their 'propaganda model' extensively criticized the U.S. media for their collusion with official U.S. foreign policy, and occasionally refer to the use of persuasive and biased words (such as euphemisms for atrocities committed by the U.S. and its 'client states'), but they do not propose a fully fledged analysis of media discourse (see, e.g., Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Herman, 1992; and Martin Rojo's study of the coverage of the Gulf War, Martin Rojo, 1995).

Also in most other critical studies of the media there is very little inspiration from linguistics, semiotics or discourse analysis. Analysis mostly does not go beyond (perceptive, but essentially impressionistic) 'readings' of the news (Manoff & Schudson, 1987), or practically relevant but undertheorized stories about well-known cases of bias (Lee & Solomon, 1990). Undertaken from the point of view, and hence with the methods (usually quantitative content analysis) of the social sciences, there is a remarkable lack of detailed analysis of the actual news stories themselves, whatever the relevance of such work (see e.g., the study of the media representation of organized labor by Puette, 1992; or the rich study on crime news by Graber, 1980).

Although in recent years there is growing influence of the British Cultural Studies paradigm, also in the USA (Hardt, 1992), this has so far led to few detailed and empirical studies of media discourse (see however, in Canada, the study of the press coverage of the peace movement by Hackett, 1991). Some critical cultural studies of 'representations' have focused on the representation of gender and 'race' in the media (Dines & Humez, 1995; see also Van Zoonen, 1994). Similarly, there is now a growing critical literature on popular culture and the media, for instance about soap operas (Ang, 1982; Liebes & Katz, 1990).

Semiotics found its way into media studies quite early, and thus brought some basic structuralist notions to the study of media discourse, and a necessary component for a broader study of media images, both in the USA and in the UK, although much of this work is descriptive rather than explicitly critical (Bruhn Jensen, 1995; Hartley, 1982; Hodge & Kress, 1988; Kress & Van Leeuwen, 1990). However, at present there is increasing integration of these semiotic studies and work in Critical Discourse Analysis. In a broader perspective it is especially the original theoretical work on social action,

actors and legitimation by Van Leeuwen that bridges the gap between semiotics and CDA (among many other studies, see Van Leeuwen, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1996).

In sum, together with feminist studies, media studies so far provide the richest ground of critical studies of discourse, but so far few of these studies are based on a systematic theory of the structures of media genres. However, increasingly the boundaries between media studies, the other social sciences as well as linguistics, semiotics and discourse analysis are being crossed, and a more detailed and explicit attention for the subtleties of 'texts' themselves has been the result. Unfortunately, much of the 'post-modern' work that shows such integration of approaches to discourse across disciplinary boundaries, appears to be less interested in a CDA perspective (for critical analysis of these postmodern approaches, see Agger, 1990, 1991; Sokal & Bricmont, 1997).

Political discourse

Given the role of political discourse in the enactment, reproduction and legitimation of power and domination, we may also expect many critical discourse studies of political text and talk. So far most of this work has been carried out by linguists and discourse analysts, because political science is among the few social disciplines in which discourse analysis has remained virtually unknown, although there is some influence of 'postmodern' approaches to discourse (Derian & Shapiro, 1989; Fox & Miller, 1995). This does not mean that political science did not know critical studies of political discourse, but these were usually limited to the study of isolated words and concepts, and seldom systematic studies of whole political texts (see, among others, e.g., Edelman, 1977, 1985; Hirschman, 1991; Shapiro, 1984; Connolly, 1983). Also, in communication studies, there are of course many studies of political communication and political rhetoric that overlap with a discourse analytical approach (Nimmo & Sanders, 1981).

One step closer to discourse analysis, is the current approach to 'frames' (a notion borrowed from cognitive science) in the analysis of political text and talk (Gamson, 1992). Such frames are conceptual structures or sets of beliefs that organize political thought, policies and discourse, and are like thematic counterparts of the notion of schematic (super)structure introduced above, namely, standard categories in the perception and analysis of an issue. For instance, social movements may be analyzed in terms of a 'collective action' frame, which in turn consists of such components as injustice (what's wrong?), agency (what are we doing about it?) and identity (who are 'we' as opposed to 'them?').

In linguistics, pragmatics and discourse studies, political discourse has received attention outside the more theoretical mainstream. Here, own and edited work by Paul Chilton has shown the way to others in the field. Thus, he edited a collection of articles on the language of the nuclear arms debate, pitching politicians and the military (and their euphemistic 'nukespeak') against the discourse of the peace movement (Chilton, 1985). This significant collection is concluded by an article on 'critical linguistics' sketching the paradigm to which these studies belong (Steiner, 1985). In his contribution Steiner proposes an interdisciplinary 'rhetorical' theory of critical linguistics, based on a

systematic analysis of action in context. Here, as well as in his later work (Chilton, 1988), Chilton shows the continuity between Orwell's invention of Newspeak in his novel *1984*, and the critical analysis of contemporary Nukespeak of politicians and the military. His own contributions especially focus on the role of metaphor in political discourse, such as the 'House' metaphor referring to Europe in post-cold war discourse (Chilton, 1996; see also the work by Schaeffner on political language and metaphor, e. g., Schaeffner & Porsch, 1993; and the study of metaphor in foreign policy by Chilton & Lakoff, 1995). This and other critical work on the discourse of war and political conflict also appeared in Schaeffner & Wenden (1995).

Geis (1987) presents a linguistic study of the interface between politics and the media, and especially of how politics is covered by the U.S. media. Influenced by earlier work of Murray Edelman (such as the notion of 'mythic themes' like 'The Conspirational Enemy'), referred to above, one of his theoretical theses is that 'normal' political language may have an indirect but stronger impact on people's political thought than expressions of strong opinions. Also for political reporting, he shows that bias is a very complex phenomenon, and that by definition all political news does have some bias, e.g., a centrist pro-American one. Geis also argues that the lexicon of everyday newspaper English hardly has really 'value free words'. He applies these and other ideas in a study of the myth-evoking rhetoric of U.S. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and finally Reagan (whose designation of the Soviet Union as the 'Evil Empire' has become widely known). Other interesting contributions of this book are his study of how political speech is reported (including the use of unnamed sources, questionable quotes and the failing to identify hearsay) as well as the role of context in speech reporting. In a study of political bias in news magazines, he also shows how verbs denoting speech may imply positive affect (like 'explain') or negative affect (like 'brag'), low volatility (like 'report') and high volatility (like 'blast'). Geis is also among the few who have studied the discourse of presidential press conferences. In sum, for the analysis of the important relations between politics and the press, this study is quite valuable, although it is partly limited to rather obvious 'linguistic' phenomena such as the use of words, and hardly addresses more complex and abstract underlying structures of political and media discourse.

Within a pragmatic framework that is theoretically closer to discourse analysis, Wilson (1990) studies a number of typical phenomena in political discourse, such as the use of metaphor; questions, answers and evasion; implications and presuppositions; implicatures; and especially the use of pronouns such as 'I' and 'We' and their implied group reference, inclusion, exclusion and allegiances.

Although studies of political discourse in English are internationally best known because of the hegemony of English, much work has been done (often earlier, and often more systematic and explicit) in German, Spanish and French. This work is too extensive to even begin to review here beyond naming a few influential studies.

Thus, Germany has a long tradition of political discourse analysis, both (then) in the West (e.g. about Bonn's politicians by Zimmermann, 1969), as well as in the former East (e.g., the semiotic-materialist theory of Klaus, 1971) (see also the introduction by Bachem,

1979). This tradition in Germany witnessed a study of the language of war and peace by Pasierbsky (1983) and of speech acts in political discourse by Holly (1990). There is also a strong tradition of studying fascist language and discourse (e.g., the lexicon, propaganda, media, and language politics (Ehlich, 1989).

Most extensively and explicitly discourse analytical, and within a clear CDA framework, is the work on political discourse in Austria by Ruth Wodak and her associates, including also the work referred to above on antisemitism, and new work on nationalism in discourse (see, e.g., Wodak, 1989, 1994, 1996; Wodak, et al., 1985, 1997; Wodak & Menz, 1990). Wodak and her associates integrate a broad range of disciplines and analytical notions in their 'discourse-historical' approach, including (social and cognitive) psychology, socio-linguistics and history. Criticizing speech act theory, for instance, they emphasize the necessity of analyzing the full social and historical context in the production of discourse and its structures and strategies. This multidisciplinary approach has been applied in many projects carried out by Wodak and her Viennese group, such as communication in organizations; language barriers in the courtroom, schools and hospitals; sexism in language; antisemitism, racism and nationalism, and especially the construction of prejudice and 'enemy images.'

Also in France the study of political language has a respectable tradition in linguistics and then in discourse analysis, also because the barrier between (mostly structuralist) linguistic theory and text analysis was never as pronounced as for instance in transformational grammar. Discourse studies are often corpus-based and there has been a strong tendency towards formal, quantitative and automatic (content) analysis of such big data-sets, often combined with critical ideological analysis (Pecheux, 1969, 1982; Guespin, 1976). The emphasis on automated analysis usually implies a focus on (easily quantifiable) lexical analyses, as suggested by the name of a major institute currently engaged in much political discourse analysis (Laboratory of Political Lexicology), in Saint Cloud, and their journal (*Mots* , 'Words').

Critical political discourse studies in Spain and especially also in Latin America has been very productive. Famous is the early critical semiotic (anticolonialist) study of Donald Duck by Dorfman & Mattelart (1972) in Chile. Lavandera, et al. (1986, 1987) in Argentina are an influential sociolinguistic approach to political discourse, for instance with a typology by Beatriz Lavandera of authoritarian discourse. Work of this group has been continued and organized in a more explicit CDA framework especially by Pardo (see, e.g., her work on legal discourse, Pardo, 1996). In Mexico, a detailed ethnographic discourse analysis of local authority and decision making was carried out by Sierra (1992). Among the many other critical studies in Latin America, we should mention the extensive work of Teresa Carbo on parliamentary discourse in Mexico, focusing especially on the way delegates speak about native Americans (Carbo, 1995), with a study in English on interruptions in these debates (Carbo, 1992).

Other genres

There are of course other discourse genres that have been studied from a critical point of view, although we are unable to review all this research. Thus, although *medical talk* has been extensively studied within a conversation analytical framework that until recently was less interested in critical approaches, there have been some studies that critically examine the well-known power-relationships between doctors and patients (Davis, 1988; Fisher, 1995; Fisher & Todd, 1986; Mishler, 1984; West, 1984; Wodak, 1996).

Similarly, if anything, *talk in the courtroom* is imbued with relationships of legalized power, in some countries, such as the USA, power over life and death, and critical (and other) discourse analysis of such talk has been around for quite some time (see e.g., Danet, 1984). Indeed, the very notion of 'powerful' and 'powerless' styles has first been introduced in studies on courtroom interaction (see, e.g., O'Barr, et al. 1978; Bradac, Hemphill & Tardy, 1981; for discussion, see also Ng & Bradac, 1993). In their critical studies of language and discourse in various institutions, also Robin Lakoff (Lakoff, 1990) and Ruth Wodak (e.g., Wodak, 1984a) have studied power relations in the courtroom (for the analysis of legal discourse see also Pardo, 1996). In a series of studies, Roger Shuy has paid extensive critical attention to, e.g., testimony and evidence in court (Shuy, 1992). A new journal (*Forensic Linguistics*) is even specialized in this area, and regularly publishes critical studies of legal discourse. Closely related, there has been critical work on bureaucratic discourse (Burton & Carlen, 1979; Radtke, 1981).

Another obvious area for critical study of text and talk is that of *education and science*, where power, ideology and reproduction have been notions in much social science research for a long time (Aronowitz, 1988; Apple, 1979; Bourdieu, 1984, 1989; Bernstein, 1975, 1990; Bourdieu, Passeron & Saint-Martin, 1994; Giroux, 1981; Willis, 1977). Many of these critical studies already pay attention to language and discourse, although systematic discourse analyses are still rare (but see, e.g., Atkinson, Davies, & Delamont, 1995; Coulthard, 1994; Duszak, 1997; Fisher & Todd, 1986; Mercer, 1995; Wodak, 1996).

One of the important critical dimensions of educational and scientific discourse is the study of the representation of women, minorities, immigrants, and in general 'other peoples' in textbooks and academic discourse (Bergvall & Remlinger, 1996; Ferree and Hall, 1996; Jaworski, 1983; Leimdorfer, 1992; Osler, 1994; Said, 1979; Smith, 1991; Van Dijk, 1987, 1993).

Finally, although business and corporate communication have received extensive (critical and other) attention (Mumby, 1988), detailed analysis of *corporate text and talk* is still rare (but see, e.g., Boden, 1994; Drew & Heritage, 1992; Ehlich, 1995; Mumby, 1993), let alone a CDA perspective on such discourse (see Mumby & Clair, 1997).

Discourse and power

Most studies briefly reviewed above deal with at least one dimension of the relationship between discourse and power. Some do so even explicitly, and analyze in detail the ways power and domination in the areas of gender, 'race', media, politics and other social

domains is expressed, enacted and reproduced by text and talk. Yet, on the whole there is still a gap between the more linguistically oriented studies of text and talk, on the one hand, and the various approaches in the social sciences, on the other hand. The first often ignore concepts and theories in sociology and political science on power abuse and inequality, whereas the second seldom engage in detailed discourse analysis. Integration of various approaches is therefore very important to arrive at a satisfactory form of multidisciplinary CDA.

Besides the more specialized studies in CDA referred to above, there are also studies and collections that deal with discourse and power in more general terms. Thus the contributions in the early and influential collection of Kramarae, Schulz & O'Barr (1984), study the power-language connection in terms of social stratification, ideologies of class and sex in education, doctor-patient relations in medical encounters, interaction in the courtroom and in the family, the role of Black Language in the USA, and a variety of sociolinguistic issues, such as language planning and literacy.

Whereas these and other early studies in CDA still largely use 'language' as the basis for studies of power (see for instance Fowler, et al, 1979), the notion of language is now often replaced by 'discourse' as the unit of actual language use in which power is enacted. Thus, in the USA, the collection edited by Kedar (1987) no longer focuses on the overall relations between language, power and politics, but on actual talk. In her introductory chapter, Deborah Tannen warns that power is not some thing someone has and someone else does not. Rather, in discourse people have different kinds of power and exercise it in different ways, and these may change dynamically as a response to the behavior of others. After these and other general chapters, the various contributions focus on power in legal settings, in politics and in the family, among others.

Within the British context, Norman Fairclough has contributed many articles and books that establish CDA as a direction of research, and that focus on various dimensions of power (see, e.g., Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b). As most British linguists working in a social and critical perspective, his linguistic orientation is that of the systemic-functional grammar of Halliday. He emphasizes that language is socially constitutive and socially formed. Thus, language use constitutes social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief. Following (but also criticizing) Foucault, he does not limit discourse analysis to the study of texts, specific communicative events or discursive practices, but also focuses on broader 'orders of discourse', viz., the collection of the many (types of) discourses defined by an institution or a domain (such as education, politics or the media). Such an approach also allows a better understanding of another notion studied by Fairclough, viz., that of intertextuality. Power in Fairclough's approach is located in the third dimension of discursive events, namely in 'social practice', which needs to be defined in terms of the properties of both the local and the global social context. Using a Gramscian approach to power and hegemony, he especially examines discursive practices as a social struggle over the hegemony over the order of discourse. These different levels or dimensions of analysis also define different types of discourse analysis, viz., description, interpretation and explanation. Texts are described but need to be interpreted relative to the processes of production and

interpretation that define discursive practices, whereas explanation (e.g., in terms of power or hegemony) needs to be given in terms of discourse as social-cultural practice in local and global social situations.

As suggested above, the relations between power and discourse are not merely studied in the more linguistically oriented CDA-approaches. Also in the area of communication and social psychology, power and dominance are notions that have received ample attention. Thus, Ng & Bradac (1993) summarize much of the work on power in language, defined as the way verbal communication influences other people. These studies correspond to the second dimension of discourse and power we introduced above, namely the influence of discourse structures on cognition, e.g., in persuasion, and its possible consequences: How people get things done by language use. For instance they may show their power through the use of (or avoidance of) a number of style characteristics and thus display a 'powerful style', for instance by avoiding hedges or tag questions. But also lexical diversity, speech rate or intensity of speech may be involved in displaying power, as is the control over turn taking or topics, or the use of mitigation.

Evaluation

Taken in a broad sense, CDA has produced a vast amount of work. Many of the social and political studies of language, language use or discourse also deal with questions of power and inequality. This is explicitly the case in most feminist work on language and discourse, as well as in the studies on racism and antisemitism. The studies of genres or whole social domains of discourse (such as media discourse) are both descriptive and more critical depending on the genres being studied. Many studies of discourse in the media, politics and education tend to be critical, whereas this is less the case for, e.g., medical talk or corporate communication.

Precisely because the critical paradigm focuses on the links between language, discourse and power, the social and political dimensions received virtually exclusive attention. The cognitive interface between discourse structures and the structures of the local and global social context is seldom made explicit, and appears usually only in terms of the notions of knowledge and ideology (Van Dijk, 1998). Thus, despite a large number of empirical studies on discourse and power, the details of the multidisciplinary *theory* of CDA that should relate discourse and action with cognition and society are still on the agenda.

An example: Discourse and racism

One of the areas in which discourse plays a fundamental role in the (re)production of inequality is that of 'race' and ethnic relations. Several studies on this issue have been reviewed above. In our own empirical work on discourse and racism, we also developed a more general theory of the relations between discourse and racism, of which a detailed discussion however is beyond the scope of this chapter (for detail, see: Van Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993). The major point of this work is that racism (including antisemitism, xenophobia and related forms of resentment against 'racially' or ethnically defined

Others) is a complex system of social and political inequality that is also reproduced by discourse.

The system of racism consists of two main dimensions, viz., a cognitive and a social one. The cognitive dimension consists of prejudiced social representations shared by dominant (white, European, but sometimes also other) groups or peoples, based on ideologies of superiority and difference. The social dimension is locally defined in terms of 'everyday racism' (Essed, 1991), that is, by the many daily interactional inequities and forms of discriminatory exclusion, marginalization and problematization against ethnic minorities or 'foreigners'. Similarly, at the global (macro) level of racism, we encounter the overall organization of ethnic inequality, for instance through systems of Apartheid and Segregation some time ago, and through contemporary immigration policies, biased media coverage, monocultural and stereotypical textbooks and education, and so on (see, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Katz & Taylor, 1988; Miles, 1989; Solomos & Wrench, 1993; Wellman, 1993).

Discourse as concrete text and talk operates at the local social level of interaction, e.g., by derogation and other negative discourse about or directed at the Others, and more globally as an 'order of dominant discourse' of the (white) majority and its institutions. At the same time, discourse relates cognitive and social structures of racism, viz., by the expression and persuasive formulation of ethnic prejudice in various social contexts. That is, much of racism is 'learned' by text and talk, along the theoretical lines explained earlier in this chapter for discourse, cognition and society more generally.

Instead of further elaborating the complex details of these theoretical relationships, we shall critically analyze some fragments of a book that may be taken as a prototype of conservative elite discourse on 'race' today, namely, *The End of Racism*, by Dinesh D'Souza (1995). This text is chosen because it embodies many of the dominant ideologies in the USA, especially on the Right, and because it specifically targets one minority group in the USA: African Americans.

The overall argument of the book is as simple as it is pernicious: African Americans have a deficient culture, for which only they are responsible, and not a history of slavery or current white racism. This culture is seen as the basis for many of the "pathologies" of the black underclass, and is maintained by the black middle class and the race relations industry in order to reap easy profits and advantages, e.g., through affirmative action.

As a main document of the New Right in the USA, this book had considerable influence on the ongoing debates on affirmative action, welfare, multiculturalism and immigration. Indeed, it is also due to such books that on all these points, current legislation of the Republican-dominated Congress as well as of Democratic president Bill Clinton is seeking policies that are restricting the rights of minority groups and immigrants.

D'Souza's enemies are not merely lower class blacks and their culture. Rather, his argument is directed against his ideological opponents, namely those he calls de 'Boasians', after anthropologist Franz Boas. In D'Souza's view, the Boasians are

responsible for the pernicious ideology of cultural relativism, according to which all cultures are equally valid, and therefore other cultures cannot be criticized for their deficiencies. Moreover, while often targeted himself, D'Souza especially focuses his ire on the 'antiracism' of the cultural relativists. Thus, as we shall see, and as the title of the book suggests, by denying racism as a major factor in U.S. society, D'Souza ultimately attempts to deny his own racism and that of many members of the "culturally-conservative" group with which he identifies himself.

Since the argument of the book specifically targets the "pathologies" of Black America, and explains these in terms of the specific African American culture which is also inherent and propagated by the black middle class, D'Souza of course violently opposes the tenet that all cultures are equal. Indeed, throughout the book, he unabashedly celebrates Western (European) culture and hegemony. Thus, if African Americans do worse in many economic and intellectual fields, this is not because of racism, which D'Souza emphatically denies or ignores (hence the title of the book), but because of their own culture.

Obviously, a detailed analysis of a 700-page book would require thousands of pages, so we need to restrict our few analytical observations to only a few passages. D'Souza's lengthy argument moves from a detailed discussion of the history of racism to contemporary issues, such as the debate about the genetic nature of IQ-differences between blacks and whites (as defended in the "Bell Curve"), from slavery to the contemporary state of Black America, and from earlier European world-exploration to contemporary western dominance. One problematic feature of the book is the partisan selection and interpretation of 'scientific' evidence (a typical characteristic of elite racism). However, such arguments are too long and complex to be critically analyzed here. So, let's focus on some other properties of his discourse.

The way we briefly analyze some of the discourse features of this book is as follows: Since this pretends to be a scholarly book, its overall structure is argumentative. It presents a number of main theses (e.g. about the pathologies of African-American culture), and tries to support these with extensive arguments, examples and historical backgrounds. We shall therefore focus on these argumentative strategies and highlight those that are quite typical (though not exclusive) for racist text and talk. At the same time, we shall make some observations on the more local properties of such discourse, such as its lexical style and rhetorical devices. We shall highlight such devices by referring to them in bold characters in the text. All words used by the D'Souza are quoted in the running text with double quotes.

As suggested above for all forms of ethnocentric and racist discourse, also this book systematically construes a stark opposition against Our positive characteristics and Their negative ones. 'Us' in this case, is the (European) West, with which D'Souza associates himself (although he is himself an Indian American). 'They' are first of all, historically, the 'primitive' peoples of the world, and in the present U.S. context, especially the African Americans. Thus, historically, racism is defined by D'Souza as a "rational and eventually scientific ideology to explain large differences in civilizational development

that could not be explained by environment (p. 22). That is, even the negatively valued concept of racism is explained in terms of positive rationality and science, which are praised as the hallmarks of western civilization. Let us examine, in somewhat more detail, which arguments and other discursive structures are deployed in order to implement this overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. We examine these moves because they are the ones that influence the formation of biased mental models and the ethnocentric social representations of the recipients, who are persuasively managed in such a way that they may tend to accept the thesis of D'Souza if they have no alternative views of

Restricting the definition of racism

A well-known way to be able to ignore accusations of racism, is to simply define racism in such a way that it does not apply to yourself. Thus for D'Souza, racism is defined as follows:

(1) From these definitions the main features of racism emerge. In order to be a racist, you must first believe in the existence of biologically distinguishable groups or races. Second, you must rank these races in terms of superiority and inferiority. Third you must hold these rankings to be intrinsic or innate. Finally, you typically seek to use them as the basis for discrimination, segregation, or the denial of rights extended to other human beings. The prevailing view, shared by virtually everyone who writes about the topic, is that racism (like sexism or homophobia) is a product of irrational antipathy. This notion of racism as a kind of pathology or dementia is a crucial and virtually uncontested core of the modern psychological portrait of the racist. (28)

The problem with this definition is that today it applies virtually only to explicit racists of the Extreme Right. Most mainstream forms of 'modern' racism are first of all not biologically based, but culturally inspired, as is the case for D'Souza himself: Other groups are disparaged because of their 'backward' culture, and excluded and marginalized not in terms of 'inferiority' but in terms of their 'deficiencies'. Note though that D'Souza when it comes to cultural evaluation does not hesitate to blame his scholarly opponents to avoid making judgments in terms of inferiority and superiority:

(2) Since contemporary scholars do not like to think of cultures as superior or inferior, advanced or backward, the very subjects of primitivism and progress, development and underdevelopment, frequently generate discomfort and even indignation. (55)

This seems to imply that D'Souza categorizes himself nevertheless as a cultural supremacist, as we shall see in more detail below when he glorifies Western culture.

Note how in the second sentence of example (1) we find an example of how D'Souza selectively reads and applies the literature on racism, and thus manipulates his non-expert readers: Most contemporary theories of racism no longer associate racism with 'irrational antipathies', but rather with a much more rational form of interest-based dominance in which the Others are excluded from competing for scarce social resources. In other words, the restriction and biased application of a definition is the typical means of the intellectual elites to deny their racism: as defined, it simply does not apply to them and their own group. This discursive move, thus, is an example of the series of moves that are intended to mitigate or deny possibly negative characteristics of the own group.

The generalization and naturalization of defects

Another move in the same series is to generalize and naturalize one's defects and thus make it harmless. Thus, whereas racism (and slavery) is usually associated with the West or with Europeans, it will not only be explained away, as we have just seen, in terms of a "rational and scientific" response to primitive peoples. Also, it will be generalized as something that is and was widespread among other peoples (e.g., Arabs, Chinese and Japanese). That is, racism is hardly a serious defect of Europeans, because it is an 'all too human' characteristic of ethnocentrism, viz., to care more for 'one's own'. Similarly, slavery was not just practiced by the West, and ethnocentrism is even 'natural':

(3) *Was slavery a racist institution?* No. Slavery was practiced for thousands of years in virtually all societies. (22)

(4) The Greeks were ethnocentric, they showed a preference for their own. Such tribalism they would have regarded as natural, and indeed we now know that it is universal. In some situations an instinctive ethnocentrism is inevitable, as when one's society is under external attacks and one must rally to its defense. (533).

(5) Tribalism and ethnocentrism are nothing more than an intense preference for one's own group over strangers. (...) While racism is necessarily rooted in biology, ethnocentrism is typically rooted in culture. (35)

Thus, generalization becomes an explanation, if not an excuse of one's own past, whereas ethnocentrism is legitimated as a "natural" response of all groups. This is one of the most common moves of ideological legitimation: Power abuse is not a self-serving, negative characteristic of dominant groups, but genetically pre-programmed. And since it is biologically inevitable, we of course hardly can do anything about it. Thus, both generalization and naturalization can be subsumed under the label of "universalism", as happens in example (3).

The denial of racism

In light of his own frequent generalizations, it is crucial that D'Souza denies that these may constitute forms of prejudice or stereotypes:

(6) Stated in this form, it is not clear that group generalizations constitute prejudice or stereotypes at all. (275)

Indeed, the **denial** of racism (a term he clearly avoids here, and substitutes by the well-known euphemisms of "prejudice" and "stereotypes") is one of the most consistent characteristics of elite racism (Van Dijk, 1992). That this is crucial in elite discourse may be explained by the fact that the prevailing positive self-image of the elites is precisely that they are broad-minded, rational and tolerant: prejudices are typically attributed to the less educated, and to the bigot.

Earlier we saw that D'Souza denies white racism by defining it away and attributing it to white supremacists. Another way to do this is to **invoke ignorance** about racism, a well-known argumentative ploy:

(7) It is impossible to answer the question of how much racism exists in the United States because nobody knows how to measure racism and no unit exists for calibrating such measurements. (276).

Thus, whereas the whole book purports to rest on rational, scholarly arguments that sustain its main thesis, namely, that there is no racism in the U.S., this claim, formulated in **academic jargon**, seems to defy

his very thesis. Indeed, if nobody is able to measure racism, how can he possibly maintain that it no longer exists?

D'Souza goes one step further in his mitigation and denial of Western or white racism and slavery. By a surprising **reversal** that enhances the positive characteristics of European civilization, he claims that it is precisely the abolition of slavery that is a major Western achievement:

(8) Abolition constitutes one of the greatest moral achievements of Western civilization. (112)

Self-glorification

Apart from denying, mitigating or explaining away one's deficiencies, we see in this last example that straightforward self-glorification is the standard form of positive self-presentation. Thus, throughout his book, D'Souza hardly holds back his admiration for Western (European) culture and accomplishments:

(9) Today Western technology has spread all over the world, homogenizing it to some extent, and generating in many areas the comforts of modern mechanization and a cosmopolitan awareness of how other people live. (48)

(10) Whatever their shortcomings and mixed motives, the Europeans who voyaged abroad were the historical instruments of a major world transformation. (49).

(11) What distinguished Western colonialism was neither occupation nor brutality but a countervailing philosophy of rights that is unique in human history. (354)

In the same way, colonialism is legitimated in terms of scientific curiosity, and racism as an explanation of "widespread and conspicuous primitivism." (48). Note in example (10) a familiar form of denying or mitigating negative characteristics of the own group, viz., the **disclaimer** : Even those who have transformed the world were of course not perfect. We also see that blatantly supremacist assertions such as those made in example (11), first need a **denial** of the established opinion about the consequences of Western colonialism.

It is only one step from an assertion of national or cultural pride and self-glorification to feelings of superiority, derogation and finally the marginalization and exclusion of the Others. D'Souza does not hesitate to make this next step, and thus defines himself as a cultural supremacist:

(12) It (Multiculturalism) forbids at the outset the possibility that one culture may be in crucial respects superior to another. (...) Seeking to avoid an acknowledgement of Western cultural superiority, relativism ends up denying the possibility of truth. (384)

In his sustained attacks against relativism and contemporary multiculturalism, his use of "acknowledgement" simply **presupposes** Western superiority (and as we have seen, not only cultural superiority), and his own (group) opinion as the truth. His ingroup bias throughout the book is so extreme, that he consistently *only* mentions what he sees as the positive aspects of Western culture, while denying, obfuscating and simply **ignoring** its

negative aspects, as we have seen. In this respect, the book is often more telling by what it leaves out than by what it says. Whereas colonialism is praised as a scientifically and economically successful endeavor and slavery is mitigated, Western-style genocide, from that of Native Americans to the Holocaust and Bosnia, is simply not mentioned. And among its technological 'advances' atom bombs and smart weapons are obviously not on top of his list.

Derogating the Others

Obviously, such a rosy picture of Western, 'white' culture needs to be construed as a base of comparison with a deficient black culture, as we continuously see through the book. Here is one of his (oft repeated) summary evaluations of African-Americans and their culture:

(13) The last few decades have witnessed nothing less than a breakdown of civilization within the African American community. The breakdown is characterized by extremely high rates of criminal activity, by the normalization of illegitimacy, by the predominance of single-parent families, by high levels of addiction to alcohol and drugs, by a parasitic reliance on government provision, by a hostility to academic achievement, and by a scarcity of independent enterprises. (477).

Note that this very list of "pathologies" is based on the application of typical conservative, U.S., white, male values and hence as culturally relative as D'Souza precisely would like to deny. Whereas crime may be universally condemned by most cultures (although the definitions of crime and deviance are again culture specific), other "pathologies" such as "illegitimacy" and "single parent families" or "parasitic reliance on government provision," are rather a breach of conservative values that are acceptable in other countries and cultures. Indeed, in the highly developed Scandinavian countries, around 50% of all families are single-parent families.

Apart from the enumeration of "deficiencies", such passages are also heavily rhetorical because of their style and specific devices. In the same way as Our positive representation needs to be enhanced, and our negative picture needs to be mitigated, Their negative picture needs to be exaggerated. The standard rhetorical move is thus one of **hyperbole**. What some may describe as 'problems', D'Souza characterizes as a "civilizational breakdown". And crime is not just crime but in a more **formal repertoire** exaggerated as "extremely high rates of criminal activity", as is also the case for drug use.

For the cultural racist, especially normative deviance is highly threatening. In the following, revealing passage, thus, D'Souza combines racist derogation of blacks with the sexist degradation of women:

(14) Perhaps the most serious of African American pathologies -- no less serious than violence -- is the routinization of illegitimacy as a way of life. The bastardization of black America is confirmed by the fact that nearly 70 percent of young black children born in the United States today are illegitimate, compared to 22 percent of white children. More than 50 percent of black households are headed by women. Almost 95 percent of black teen mothers are unmarried, compared to 55 percent of their white peers. (515)

Thus, **hyperbole** ("most serious") is piled upon hyperbolic **metaphor** ("pathologies") to condemn what he calls "illegitimacy" and what in other countries and cultures is a

common way of life. Even here, if unmarried mothers can be seen as victims, they are not only **blamed**, but even accused of the "bastardization of black America". The very lexicalization and definition of the social situation of poor black women, associates them, as the racist prejudice against blacks implies, with violence and breaking the law, if not with sexual promiscuity and other threats to a sane America. The **number game** of comparative statistics supplies the apparent objectivity to this conservative opinion. In the same **metaphorical** vein, comparisons from the field of threatening sickness are used to conclude at the end of his book his moral critique of African Americans as well as his ideological critique of the relativists:

(15) Relativism has become a kind of virus, attacking the immune systems of institutional legitimacy and public decency. (532)

Metaphorically assuming the role of the protective immune system of 'America', D'Souza feels legitimated to attack of the similarly metaphorical "virus" of relativism. The ideological Others are a serious threat to Our (i.e., conservative) values, and hence need to be destroyed. Combined with the frequent references to violence, threats and danger, associated with blacks throughout the book, these metaphorical arguments frame the opposition between Us and Them in terms of the legitimate attack against those who threaten our society and its values, and even our civilization. Again **metaphorically**, the ethnic conflict is thus hyperbolically redefined as a "culture war" (p. 535). For this reason, also, it is not surprising that the end of the book suggests a return to the system of "natural rights", namely, the "right" of civilization to defend itself against the "barbarians" (p. 533).

The classical racist derogatory label for blacks was that they are 'lazy'. D'Souza is sufficiently sophisticated not to unambiguously use such a label in the description of African Americans. Yet, he takes recourse to a more indirect, **academic lexical style** to say the same thing, and to legitimate it through an historical explanation:

(16) Slavery as a system can legitimately be blamed for a culture of self-defeating and irresponsible attitudes and behavior among black Americans. (97)

(17) (...) a series of measures to avoid, postpone and minimize work. (97).

Thus, whereas D'Souza refuses to recognize that current racism and the position of the black underclass are historically rooted in slavery, he *does* use slavery in order to 'explain' the 'lazy' character of blacks, viz., in terms of the **euphemistic** formulation of laziness in example (17).

The second racist prejudice about blacks is that they are particularly prone to crime. The rhetorical argumentative way to do this is by the well-known **number game** of descriptive statistics:

(18) Even discounting for the possibility of some racial bias in criminal arrests, it seems clear that the average black person is between three and six times more likely to be arrested for a crime than the average white person. (260)

Note the initial **disclaimer** that admits, but then **mitigates** ("some"), possibly "racial bias" (not: 'racism') in arrests. Of course, even if these numbers should be correct, D'Souza will not even try to explain them in terms of class -- indeed, in terms of the similarly stark discrepancy in the distribution of wealth, and the possible explanation of crime in terms

of poverty, lack of work, and indeed (barely conceded) racism. On the contrary, since he rejects (after much hesitation) a biological explanation of black criminality, he adopts an explanation in terms of cultural "pathologies", which of course can be easier blamed on the Others than biological predisposition. And by using "average" he does not locate crime in poor neighborhoods but attributes it to African Americans in general, a form of **generalization** that is typical of racist discourse.

Thirdly, African Americans will typically be derogated because of their appearance and behavior:

(19) (...) the hardened gleam in many Afrocentric eyes... virtually cultic pattern of lockstep behavior: everyone dresses alike, and when the leader laughs, everyone laughs... (381)

In this example the targets are not poor, criminal ghetto-kids, as D'Souza sees them, but intellectuals, professors, to whom the observed "pathologies", and hence the cultural explanation, hardly apply. Here and elsewhere, thus, despite his explicit statements to the contrary, it is the whole African-American group which he derogates -- especially their leaders and intellectuals, since they are D'Souza's main ideological opponents. The academic style of the book in this case yields to a rhetoric of **repetition**, **hyperbole**, **ridicule**, and **metaphors** of hardness ("hardened gleam"), and of thoughtless military ("lockstep behavior"), as in example (16).

Thus, whereas the black middle class is denied any economic diligence, those blacks who *are* successful, such as famous professors, need to be dealt with in other ways in order to keep the attack consistent, as is the case in the following passage about a famous African American professor, Cornell West:

(20) [his] solutions are a quixotic combination of watered-down Marxism, radical feminism, and homosexual rights advocacy, none of which offers any realistic hope for ameliorating black pathologies. (520)

As suggested, black (and white) anti-racist intellectuals, and in general the relativists and multiculturalists, are D'Souza's ideological enemies. Whereas poor blacks are derogated with contempt, the intellectuals who cannot be persuaded by racist arguments, are attacked with **ridicule** ("quixotic") and by **associating** them with all that is vile in conservative eyes (marxism, feminism, homosexual rights). This passage is interesting because it shows how underlying racist attitudes may be related to other attitudes governed by a conservative (meta)ideology, viz., those of anti-communism, anti-feminism, and anti-homosexuality.

Whereas his intellectual competitors are ridiculed, lower class black youths will be derogated by even more explicit forms of verbal racism:

(21) (Jobs?). Yet it seems unrealistic, bordering on the surreal, to imagine underclass blacks with their gold chains, limping walk, obscene language, and arsenal of weapons doing nine-to-five jobs at Procter and Gamble or the State Department. Many of these young men seem lacking in the most basic skills required for steady employment: punctuality, dependability, willingness to perform routine tasks, acceptance of authority. Moreover studies show that even when jobs are available, many young blacks refuse them, apparently on the grounds that the jobs don't pay enough or that crime is more profitable. (504-5)

(22) Yet black culture also has a vicious, self-defeating, and repellent underside that it is no longer possible to ignore or euphemise. As more and more blacks seem to realize, no good is achieved by dressing these pathologies in sociological cant, complete with the familiar vocabulary of disadvantage and holding society to account. Society must do its part, and black must do theirs. But first, the magnitude of the civilizational crisis facing the black community must be recognized. This crisis points to deficiencies not of biology but of culture; yet they are deficiencies and they should be corrected. (486)

Again, in (21), we find the familiar moves of **stereotyping**, **over-generalization** and **hyperbole**: All underclass black youths are alike, and they are like their prototype, as construed by D'Souza. We thus get a textual sample of the mental group schema D'Souza entertains about those he loathes, featuring negative characterizations of appearance, behavior and character -- measured by the values that D'Souza holds dear. And the hyperbolic reference to the "surreal" also shows the essentialism of D'Souza's racism: Poor black youths are simply unimaginable in 'normal' jobs. Casual reference to scholarly "studies" finally provides the academic legitimation of such statements, a well-known **argumentative fallacy** (authority). The hyperbolic style continues in example (22), in one of these explicit messages in which poor blacks are represented as "vicious", "self-defeated," and "repellent." As presented here, these are **presupposed** facts, which need to be frankly recognized. It is in this vein, then, that lower class blacks are also seen to continue the tradition of slavery's "bad nigger", who is also presented as a "menace to African Americans and the larger society" (p. 524). Thus, the derogation of blacks is not merely a question of emphasizing cultural differences or deviance, but to warn against a *threat*, and hence to legitimate various forms of ingroup 'defense' against such danger.

Where reality clashes with ideological principles, reality needs to be altered. Thus, the reality of racism is denied or mitigated, as we have seen. Even more effective is the well-known move of reversal in much racist discourse: Not *we* are racist, but *they* are, *they* are the *real* racists:

(23) Racial victimization supplies a license for bigotry which is disguised as a campaign for equality and social justice. It is no surprise, therefore, that white racism seems less overt and less threatening to the life chances of other groups, while black racism is more explicitly menacing. (421)

Thus, 'black racism' is invented as another reason to derogate African Americans, and by focusing on small radical groups (such as the Nation of Islam of Farrakhan), D'Souza thus **redefines the situation** of race relations in the U.S.A. Note how this is not merely a form of simple **reversal**, but also involves a **hyperbolically** emphasized **contrast** (between white and black), when D'Souza introduces one of the racist prejudices of blacks: violence and threat, while at the same time **denying** the dire consequences of white racism on the position of the African-American community.

It is not surprising in this strategy of consisted denial of racism, when D'Souza attacks those who do experience and observe racism in the U.S.A.:

(24) Sometimes racism is all too real, but it is bad enough to endure real racism without having to suffer imaginary racism as well. Racism have become the opiate of many middle-class blacks. For society, promiscuous charges of racism are dangerous because

they undermine the credibility of the charge and make it more difficult to identify real racists. For blacks, the risk of exaggerated and false charges of racism is that they divert attention from the possibilities of the present and the future. Excessive charges of racism set up a battle with an adversary who sometimes does not exist (...) Once again, racism becomes the culprit, now accused of having taken an even

subtler and more insidious shape. (487).

(25) For them, apparently, antiracist militancy is carried to the point of virtual mental instability. It is hard to imagine whites feeling secure working with such persons: surely such inflamed ethnic insensitivities are now what companies have in mind when they extol the diversity of work environments. Yet if these individuals are cranks, they are in respectable company. (492).

Beginning with the familiar **disclaimer** of the **Apparent Concession** (of the type 'of course there is some racism, but...'), example (24), sets out to deny racism by calling it (mostly) "exaggerated" if not "imaginary". The opponent in this argument is now the black middle class, which is thus attributed a form of delusion, if not, as we have seen before, a calculated strategy to enrich itself. Typically, in one of the many forms of **Blaming the Victim**, even here the concept of "danger" is associated with blacks, thereby warranting D'Souza's attack. In (25) D'Souza goes all the way in his ire. From an accusation of imagining things, he now associates "antiracist militancy" of middle-class blacks with "mental instability" -- explicitly providing reasons to exclude such blacks from the work force. In D'Souza's view, this extreme form of blaming (and even firing) the victims, would probably be a form of 'rational discrimination'. Note the series of metaphors and hyperboles in which this attack is couched: opponents are degraded by associating them with military violence, or with mental illness.

We see that virtually the whole community of African Americans, lower class and middle class, the intellectuals and the poor, women and men, tend to be systematically belittled, ridiculed, derogated and attacked by D'Souza. Defending the paragon of white civilization, he thus blatantly concludes, barely **metaphorically** :

(26) For many whites the criminal and irresponsible black underclass represents a revival of barbarism in the midst of Western civilization. (527)

Hiding behind the others of the ingroup with which he associates himself (a familiar move of **transfer**), D'Souza thus formulates his own opinion about underclass blacks, but often enough forgets the class restriction and simply speaks of the "pathologies" of black culture in general. The overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, through **hyperbolic emphasis**, **negative lexicalization** ("barbarians") of the **contrast** between Us and Them, thus excludes The Others from the community of the civilized, as also the Greeks did with the barbarians. Blacks are not the only ones who are thus degraded in D'Souza's book. At the end, in the framework of a discussion of immigration, also Muslims are stereotypically portrayed in terms of lacking tolerance and as engaged in a *jihad* (p. 548). For the cultural supremacist, a multicultural America is thus

unthinkable: all immigrants (that is, those who are permitted to enter in the first place) must be culturally assimilated within the dominant, white, western culture (p. 549).

Attributing selfish interests

Deficiencies may be involuntary, and hence less blamable. It is therefore crucial, especially in a perspective of cultural racism, to make sure that the Others' pathologies are at least partly voluntary or intentional. Thus, one familiar move, not only in the USA, is to accuse the Others (or their wardens) of having a "vested interest" in the perpetuation of such pathologies:

(27) There is now in place a civil rights establishment which has a vested interest in making exaggerated accusations of racism. (23)

(28) The civil rights establishment has a vested interest in the persistence of the underclass, because the scandalous pathologies of poor blacks create the public sympathy that legitimizes continuing subsidies to the black middle class. (23)

(29) If racism were to disappear many of these activists and bureaucrats would be out of a job. (23).

Moreover, if such vested interests are associated with something as vile as making money at the expense of others, the opponents at the same time may be accused of moral depravity. To do this, it is not sufficient to emphasize the social problems of the ghetto by continuous repetition of the **metaphor** of sickness ("pathologies") in its hyperbolic form ("scandalous"), but also to construct it as a **contrast**, viz., between the (well-to-do) "middle class" and the "poor". Throughout the book, thus, the luxury and ostentatious nature of well-to-do African Americans is spelled out in detail (as is also typical for many media representations of African leaders), as in the following description of Farrakhan:

(30) Louis Farrakhan reportedly uses the profits to subsidize a lavish lifestyle which includes expensive silk suits and stretch limousine. (426)

Note incidentally that those ('the --white-- public' presumably) who are presupposed to subsidize the blacks are casually attributed, in example (28), a positive characteristic ("sympathy"), thereby further emphasizing the **polarization** between Us and Them, and the **contrast** between our good qualities and their bad ones. Note also that the Others need to be negatively described **lexically**. Thus, civil rights workers will first be derogated as representing an "establishment", and hence attributed some form of power. This is important, because minorities are not usually associated with having any power, let alone with being a dominant institutional force, as also the word "bureaucrat" in (29) suggests. More individually, as in example (29), such people are invariably called "activists" throughout the book, even when applied to black (or solidary white) professors who write books on racism. Indeed, all ideological opponents of D'Souza are called "activists", thus associating them not just with other opinions but with (violent) actions, and the "violent" civil rights movement of the 1960s. We see how argumentative strategies of derogation are often accompanied by several stylistic and rhetorical means in expressing and conveying negative opinions about the Others.

Legitimizing racism

Once the ingroup's own racism has been defined away by limiting it to biologically racism, and by attributing it to extremist bigots, the next step is to legitimate once's own brand of racism, viz., the kind of racism that may not be called 'racism':

(31) This rational discrimination is then identified as racism, But such an identification is wrong, because rational discrimination is based on group conduct, not biology. Rational discrimination is not premised upon assumptions of biological superiority. Its existence compels us to revise the liberal paradigm which holds that racism is the theory and discrimination the practice. (286)

This indeed, is one of the central theses of the book: Discrimination may be right, when it is rational, that is, in people's own best interest. The problem with this argument is that classical racism, whether biologically legitimated or not, always *was* also economic, and in the best interests of whites. And whether its basis is overtly biological, or masked as culturally and economically based discrimination and feelings of superiority, does not make any difference to its victims. Racism is not defined in terms of good or bad intentions, but in terms of its effects on ethnic relations. Note the repeated reference to rationality, one of the hallmarks of the positive self-image of western elites.

In his discussion of the IQ-debate, spawned by Herrnstein and Murray's book, *The Bell Curve*, D'Souza does not hesitate to flirt with the biological supremacism of some scientific discourse in order to legitimate racism:

(32) If IQ differences between racial groups are inherited and are substantial, then it is impossible to close the Pandora's Box and we have to ask the alarming questions: was the Southern racist position basically correct, and are some forms of segregation and discrimination justified? (465)

Here, and in many other passages, he simply **presupposes** that IQ differences between white and black are uncontested, and that if they exist they do not depend on socio-economic, but on genetic factors. By focusing his derogation on African Americans, he apparently does not merely defines this group in cultural terms, but also in 'racial' ones, so that his distinction between biologically based racism, and rational, culturally based discrimination collapses. When he finally, and nearly regrettably, retracts and rejects biological arguments of white superiority in favor of cultural hegemony, this has only one fundamental reason: Biological dispositions cannot be blamed on the victims, but cultural "pathologies" can. Moreover, for D'Souza these are not rooted in the socio-economic environment, but are inherent in the culture and character of African Americans, including "family structure and socialization practices" (p. 474):

(33) The conspicuous pathologies of blacks are the product of catastrophic cultural change that poses a threat both to the African American community and to society as a whole. (478)

It hardly needs to be observed how **hyperboles** ("catastrophic cultural change") accompany the derogation of the Others, and how D'Souza's prejudices about blacks (their violence and threats) also appear in his formulation.

Conclusion

Our critical analysis of some passage of D'Souza's *The End of Racism* shows what kind of discursive structures, strategies and moves are deployed in exercising the power of the dominant (white, western, male) group, and how readers are manipulated to form or confirm the social representations that are consistent with a conservative, supremacist ideology. The overall strategy is the combined implementation, at all levels of the text, of the positive presentation of the ingroup and the negative presentation of the outgroup. In D'Souza's book, the principal rhetorical means are those of hyperbole and metaphor, viz., the exaggerated representation of social problems in terms of illness ("pathologies", "virus"), and the emphasis of the contrast between the Civilized and the Barbarians. Semantically and lexically, the Others are thus associated not simply with difference, but rather with deviance ("illegitimacy") and threat (violence, attacks). Pragmatically, argumentative assertions of the depravity of black culture, are combined with denials of white deficiencies (racism), with rhetorical mitigation and euphemization of its crimes (colonialism, slavery), and semantic reversals of blame (blaming the victim). Social conflict is thus cognitively represented and enhanced by polarization, and discursively sustained and reproduced by derogating, demonizing and excluding the Others from the community of Us, the Civilized.

Acknowledgement

I am indebted to Ruth Wodak for her comments on an earlier version of this chapter, and to Laura Pardo for further information about CDA research in Latin America.

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Size: 22244 words, 150 KB

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